

~~CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR RELEASE~~ESTIMATING THE NATURE AND THE MAGNITUDE OF
THE EXTERNAL THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

NOTE: The following memorandum pretends to be no more than a preliminary sketch of a vast subject about which Americans, at least, have no generally accepted body of doctrine. Bearing the purpose of our discussion in mind a compromise has been struck between two possible lines of approach, and like many compromises the result may compound the infirmities of both alternatives. For many problems it is convenient to have a comprehensive check list of all factors entering into any estimate of national strength. For the specific problem of estimating the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat -- and accomplishing this without benefit of "classified" information -- it may be useful to propose a selection of elements with the most direct bearing on the problem at hand.

PRELIMINARY

1. In the most comprehensive sense security can be taken to mean freedom from loss or fear of losing what is highly valued. In this sense security does not mean exemption from any loss or expectation of losing, but implies rather that activity of a certain positive scope is permitted to continue.

Following this line of thought national security is often spoken of as security from and security for. Negatively, it is freedom from war or loss of independence. When there is peace and the outlook for peace is bright, there is security; and also when there is freedom from external dictation. Positively, national security is freedom to pursue the more abundant life by peaceful means.

2. The split between the Soviet and the non-Soviet world creates a continuing state of insecurity in which it is essential to maintain high levels of defense expenditure. To recognize the continuing cleavage does not imply that all-out war is the "inevitable" outcome of the crisis, or that the only effective instruments of national defense are military. On the contrary we hold that war is "evitable", not "inevitable"; and we rely upon diplomatic, economic, and psychological as well as military instruments for the success of our defense.

3. Our policy perspective can be characterized as follows in the present crisis:

First, we desire to deter the Soviet leadership from aggression.

Second, we hope to induce the decision makers of the SU to put aside their policies of aggression, and agree to the reduction of armaments within the framework of the UN, including arrangements for thorough and continuing inspection. (We regard arms control not as the goal but the precondition of an epoch in which the vast potentialities of modern science and technology will be applied for the good of all.)

Third, if all else fails, we must be prepared to repel aggression and to liquidate the aggressors' regimes, replacing them with governments able and willing to cooperate peacefully in the world community.

4. At every step the choice of appropriate policy depends upon estimating the nature and magnitude of the threat confronting us currently and prospectively. In appraising the threat, it is necessary to estimate the intention of Soviet decision makers, and the capabilities at their disposal. This calls for an analysis of the factors determining current and future Soviet policy as it affects our security.

A. What are the current intentions of Soviet decision makers concerning the security of the US?

1. Is the aim to prepare as rapidly as possible for an all-out aggression?
2. Is the aim to achieve dominance by measures short of all-out aggression?
3. Is the aim to achieve security without achieving dominance?
(or some combination of the foregoing)

B. What current capabilities are at the disposal of Soviet policy affecting the security of the US?

1. Are these capabilities sufficient to accomplish aim one above?
2. Are they sufficient to accomplish aim two?

(Aim three is more a matter of intention than capability)

C. What factors account for the current intentions and capabilities of Soviet policy? (An assessment of dominant and subordinate factors in the equilibrium of policy making and execution.)

1. What factors originating inside the SU are or have been important?

(Domestic and foreign policy: political, economic, military, psychological)

2. What factors originating outside the SU have been important?

- a. What has been the impact of US policy?

(Domestic and foreign: political, economic, military psychological)

- b. What has been the impact of the policy of other powers than the US, notably Britain, France, Italy, West Germany?

(Domestic and foreign: political, economic, military, psychological)

(Recall that the effect of one power upon another may be direct or indirect through other powers)

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D. What are the future intentions and capabilities of Soviet policy affecting US security (mid-range, long range?)

1. What factors originating inside the SU will be important?

(Note that this is a matter of assessing the future impact of factors operating currently, and of new factors expected to emerge.)

2. What factors originating outside the SU will be important?

a. What will be the impact of potential US policies?

(This is the point at which it is appropriate to consider policy alternatives that have already been recommended, and to seek to invent new solutions.)

b. What will be the impact of the potential policies of other powers than the US?

5. A continuous exercise of judgment is necessary if estimates of the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat are to be kept current. Plans must be subject to more or less perpetual review and revision as our expectations change. It is necessary to devise strategies with all contingencies in view, extending from the most unfavorable to the most favorable possibilities.

The range of contingencies may be clarified somewhat if we subject the most extreme potentialities to examination.

Contingency A postulates that the hostile and uncooperative intentions of the Soviet leaders will continue despite our efforts to modify them; and that every effort will be made to build up the capabilities of the Soviet world to the point where an all-out offensive against the US and Western Europe will succeed in breaking our resistance. Even this contingency does not assume that all-out war will necessarily come. The postulate is that the capabilities of the Soviet world will in fact be built up to somewhere near the peak of their potential; and that only estimates made when the crisis has intensified to this degree will determine whether the Soviet leaders launch the offensive. If the Soviet leadership begins at such a point to relinquish the aim of preparing a full-scale assault, the situation will then coincide with one of the contingencies we have called B.

Contingency B, by contrast, postulates that the effective intentions of the Soviet leadership can be changed short of all-out war in the direction of increasing cooperation and abating the world crisis of insecurity. The chief possibility to be explored is the impact on Soviet intentions if we do in fact clearly begin to out-arm, out-develop, out-consume, out-persuade and out-negotiate the Soviet world.

CONTINGENCY A

6. We are assuming in what follows that the leadership of the SU remains persistently hostile and seeks to gain preponderating offensive strength sufficient (a) to induce Western Europe and the US to yield to an ultimatum without resisting; or (b) to inflict a devastating blow upon the capability of the West to resist.

We deal later with the "realism" of this postulate concerning the intentions of the Soviet leaders. For the present the task is to answer the question: What is the maximum strength of the offensive that the enemy might launch now, and at all future dates? We then consider potential policies of national defense capable of frustrating this intention.

7. One preliminary question must be disposed of. Is it likely that the enemy will be able to attack with weapons of unheard of destructiveness? If so, we are bereft of any rational basis for arriving at an estimate of the military peril to our national security.

Without attempting to close debate on this topic, we may nevertheless offer the following comment: It is unlikely that great surprises are in store for us. Or, for that matter, for the enemy. Both sides have access to the same stock of basic scientific and engineering principles, and allowing for the fact that solutions usually differ somewhat in efficiency and timing, the identical problems are likely to receive similar answers at about the same time. Our confidence in this view is strengthened by our knowledge of the history of modern inventions.

In making our calculation of weapon type in the hands of the enemy we are justified in assuming that he will have at his disposal the best weapons that we ourselves possess. The question of weapon type now becomes quantitative in the sense that if the same volume of talent and facilities is directed toward research and development, comparable results can be expected.

8. We therefore consider first the scale of Soviet capabilities for aggression.

A limiting factor is the magnitude of the outlay necessary for consumption. What per capita rates of consumption shall we assume?

Comment: Only token concessions need be made in the future beyond the levels now prevailing in the Soviet Union.

What volume of manpower will be available for the armament program?

Estimates are available of the recent and prospective growth of the Soviet population, and of production and productivity in major lines. (We shall not summarize these figures here, since our chief purpose is to consider the kinds of knowledge and judgment relevant to our central problem).

Perhaps the most useful simplification of the complex elements entering into long-term military strength are manhours and productivity. (In this simplification resources are left out of the equation. It is evident that over short periods resource shortages may limit an armament program. But this factor is to some extent counteracted by stockpiling, and over longer period by substitution. The resource factors affecting the Soviet Union can be dealt with in detail, of course, by creating "models" of the future, describing all "flows" and "stocks" at present and future dates. However, it is not certain that the assumptions introduced piecemeal into such models are any more reliable than the assumptions introduced all at once in the "heroic simplification" made above.)

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In order to estimate the weight of the offensive, it is necessary to subtract the outlay for defensive purposes. We therefore ask: What proportion of Soviet military outlay currently goes to the preparation of offense?

Even in the absence of classified information, we may nonetheless hope to arrive at an approximation based upon "open" sources and expert judgment.

Is it likely that this proportion will be increased or diminished in the next few years?

Comment: These projects will probably not be reduced but, if anything, increased. Soviet leaders are well aware of the present inferiority of the Soviet economy as a whole in relation to the US, and of the great importance of narrowing the gap as rapidly as possible.

Moreover, the Soviet leadership has a tradition of conspiracy and surprise; and surprise on a global scale can come from the development of unconventional weapons. Does the conception of a "knock-out blow" appeal to the imagination of Soviet leaders? If it were possible to prepare and administer a staggering blow to the American economy, the Soviet elite might gain in several ways. The US threat might be removed for a few years. And Soviet leaders may imagine that the unity of America would be so much impaired by a great disaster that the nation would never recover.

A factor favoring offense is the low regard in which human lives are held in Soviet power struggles. Presumably Soviet leaders are prepared to keep civilian protection at a minimum.

The cost of weapons that must be made effective at great distances is great, and can be expected to become greater as technology develops.

In sum, the Soviet Union is likely to possess the same unconventional weapons that we have, and to devote an increasing proportion of their military outlay to research and development projects connected therewith.

It is necessary to translate the aggregate weight of offensive strength into meaningful categories of potential destructiveness. This calls for the postulation of a balance among offensive weapons which, in the judgment of experts, is capable of doing the most damage to the US. We also postulate that these weapons are applied according to the best plan (in the same sense).

Since military journals and testimony before Congressional Committees contain studies of the problems involved, it is possible to make assumptions which are "respectable" in professional military circles, without the benefit of classified information.

9. We are now in a position to consider the magnitude of the counter-action on our part that would prevent this employment of maximum Soviet capability from destroying our capacity to prosecute a successful offensive against the Soviet Union in a comparatively short period of time after the attack.

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Observe that at this point we are not evaluating the likelihood that Soviet intentions will in fact be sustained through the exertions necessary to bring Soviet capabilities to the peak. (As we shall indicate later, internal factors may prevent this; or our own policies may succeed in heading off these extreme developments.) Nor are we estimating the probability that if the peak of Soviet capability is approached, Soviet leaders will actually mount an all-out offensive. The immediate point is that since these contingencies are conceivable, we must give them weight.

If we are targets for a vast initial aggression, severe damage may be done to our forces in being and to our system of production. How much loss can we wisely risk? Clearly we must be able to launch a powerful counter-attack instantly, and to sustain this attack from stocks for a reasonable time until we are able to support the operation from current production.

What "lag period" shall we select between the initial losses and the attaining of a level of current production capable of supporting our offensive?

Some general policy considerations can be mentioned which bear on this question. It is important to bring the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest moment. The sacrifices of modern warfare are so enormous that they ought to be endured no longer than necessary. These sacrifices involve every basic value. There is life itself; and there are the liberties and moralities of civil society, all of which are endangered by a garrisoned existence.

Another overriding policy is that at all times we intend to keep our forces in being and our stocks at the lowest point consistent with national safety. There is such a thing as "dys-preparation" for defense, which consists in activities ordinarily regarded as strengthening national defense, but whose side-effects nullify their contribution to national security.

"Dys-preparation" can take the form of putting too much reliance upon military weapons rather than upon an integrated and balanced program in which economic, political, and psychological policies play their full part. Excessive concern with piling up arms can result in the accumulation of obsolete equipment and the dissipation of resources. Potential allies can be alienated if they conclude that we are, in fact, "war-mongers" provoking the Soviet Union. Cleavages may develop inside our own body politic.

Cracks may also appear in our national unity as a result of diminishing or stationary levels of consumption. Disunity may be fostered as the centralization of power in national and military hands brings about the restriction of our traditional freedoms. Police measures flourish in a climate of fear and suspicion; and may eventually bring a full garrison-police state into existence.

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(Perhaps the chief inference to be drawn from the foregoing considerations is the reminder that there is no such thing as total security, and that we must be prepared to take calculated risks.)

In deciding how great these risks should be, we need to take into account the rate and duration of the offensive action on our part that will destroy the capability of the Soviet Union for organized resistance.

It is essential to select the weapon combination and the strategic plan which has the support of expert opinion. (The major possibilities have been discussed in professional journals and Congressional Hearings.)

(We have already called for estimates of the defensive strength of the Soviet Union. Obviously many of these defenses must be destroyed before the main target centers of the SU are exposed to destruction.)

When we have estimated the rate and duration of our counter-offensive, according to weapon type and scale, we can make the translation into production requirements (in the aggregate, manpower at given rates of productivity).

It is reasonable to accept as a calculated risk the prospect of losing an amount of productive capacity that still keeps in our hands the capability of reaching, after a few months, the level of output enabling us to support the counter-offensive that we began when the aggression was undergone.

Comment: Shall we assume "a few months" take six months, or longer? Before settling upon any figure, it will be necessary to draw a comprehensive picture of the burdens which are disclosed by alternative calculations. Clearly, the shorter the "lag" (or "overtake") period, the higher the level of readiness that must be maintained in the form of forces in being and of stocks. If an "overtake" period is stretched out, our level of readiness may be too low to deter the enemy from aggression; and if the aggression occurs, our loss of forces and of productive capacity may be so grave that counter-offensive action, on a sufficient scale, is ruled out for years (if, indeed, it will be possible at all). Note, too, that the effectiveness of our counter-moves may be handicapped by an excessive diversion of resources into defensive preparations, greatly delaying our success, and prolonging the crisis.

To the extent that we attach probability to Contingency A, we reconcile ourselves to vast military outlays, since enormous expenditures are necessary if a deterring influence is to be exerted upon Soviet leaders at the crucial time when they are nearing the peak of their capability. We postulate in Contingency A that the effective intentions of the Soviet leadership will be changed, if at all, when they are clearly out-armed — and that this can happen only after great efforts have been made.

Because Contingency A assigns a great role to the military instruments of policy, there is grave danger that all considerations of statesmanship will be lost sight of by those who attach importance to A. This might end in disaster for American policy.

It is probable that our chances of successful armament programs will be seriously compromised if we act as though we were only interested in "hardware" arguments in world politics. Our policies of economic development will not only contribute to long range fighting potentials; they will, if properly correlated with diplomacy and propaganda, contribute to that political unification of rulers and ruled which is so important in a long struggle for survival. Such a spectacle of growing unity on our side — coupled with evidence of total strength — can influence the expectations of the Soviet elite in directions favorable to pacific adjustment.

As indicated above, if Contingency A is realized without culminating in all-out war, this will be because Soviet leaders eventually change their effective intentions (on the basis of expectations which they come to accept). Contingency B specifies a future in which Soviet intentions are more malleable from an earlier time. The crisis does not reach the gravity which has been postulated as Contingency A.

CONTINGENCY B

10. We now change our postulates and assume that Soviet leaders change their hostile and non-cooperative intentions after a few years. A comprehensive study of this contingency would require a detailed evaluation of significant internal and external factors likely to be in play. In this discussion a few will be touched upon briefly. We begin with a few "doctrinal" and "structural" factors.

One of the principal internal factors is the nature and rigidity of Soviet Doctrine, as presently and prospectively conceived and applied by the Soviet leadership. Is the doctrine unambiguous in predicting inevitable victory in an all-war?

Comment: The Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine is full of ambiguity. While the victory of the "proletariat" over the "capitalist class" is predicted, doctrinal support can be found for several versions of how the outcome is to be brought about.

According to some statements, the proletarian state is sure to be the target of hostile encirclement by capitalistic states intent upon its liquidation. Sooner or later, therefore, the enemies of the SU will resume the struggle — broken off in 1921 — to crush the "fatherland of the proletariat" by force. On the other hand, some doctrines support the view that the world triumph of the proletarian revolution will be achieved in another way. The forecast is that the capitalist world is torn by rivalries which prevent it from uniting effectively in time to crush the ever-strengthening center of world communism. In this sense, "peaceful co-existence" is feasible: The capitalist world decays while the productive forces at the disposal of socialist and communist states are augmented.

In view of the inconsistencies in Bolshevik doctrine as interpreted by various authorities it appears that a considerable range of choice is left to the decision-makers of the Soviet world in adapting doctrine to policy.

How much weight is to be given to the deliberate sustaining of foreign crisis as a means of retaining dictatorial power? This is standard technique in tyrannical and dictatorial systems.

Comment: It is unlikely that this factor will lead to "adventurism" on the part of Soviet leaders. They are continually cautioned by the "code" against giving way to adventurism, which is dismissed as a form of sentimentality in politics.

Regardless of conscious purpose, is not the position of the Soviet leadership likely to develop "intolerable tensions"? Hence even the "peacefulness of being at war" will be welcome.

Comment: This interpretation exaggerates the disagreeable features of the situation occupied by the dictators. It is true there is tension; but there are compensating privileges. Moreover the "tension level" of individuals in a group does not oscillate in unison. (We cannot assume they will "blow up" at the same moment.) There are many channels short of war for the relief of stress: "wine, women, and song", psychosomatic infirmities, extra hard work, etc.

Among the factors in the future of Soviet development we must evaluate the "normalization" of crisis.

Comment: It has been suggested that human beings change their conceptions of "normality" as crisis continues, and that pluralizing tendencies gradually find expression. Despite "war scares" the mere continuation of the crisis indicates that the scares have been exaggerated. Hence there is some relaxation of the will to sacrifice for long-run aims, coupled with greater concern for immediate enjoyments (including more "privileges" for the family, profession, neighborhood, and other constituent groups of Soviet society). Scientists and engineers may be expected to become adept in pursuing their theoretical interests in the name of defense; "science as usual" often flourishes behind the prevailing militancy of phrase. (Even the military becomes accustomed to projects of research and development instead of fighting.) Such activities serve as psychological equivalents of war, and cater to the subtle ceremonialization of military life. All this makes it easy to defer "pushing the button" and exchanging the risks of total war for the relative security of perpetual crisis.

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Would the effect of the sudden death of the principal Soviet figure create a situation in which foreign militancy would seem to be a necessary means of maintaining unity?

Comment: The Stalin-Trotsky split gave the Communists a serious warning concerning the consequences of any failure to provide for a smooth succession. We cannot assume that whatever arrangements have been made will necessarily prevent a bitter struggle inside the top circles of the Party; or even a struggle that goes beyond the Party. However, the seriousness of the decision to launch an all-out conflict is well recognized; and the loss of a central figure is more likely to create a sense of weakness than an exaggerated feeling of strength.

Is it likely that the hyper-suspiciousness which characterizes the Soviet leaders will prevent them from enlarging the zone of cooperation?

Comment: The "police mentality" of despots is exaggerated in the Soviet case by the importance of political police experience as a ladder to top positions. The Stalinist Politburo is composed of a majority of persons who have held political police jobs.

Although it cannot be denied that suspiciousness is a factor working against peaceful cooperation, it must be pointed out that extreme suspiciousness works in contradictory ways (in common with most highly emotional attitudes). If, on the one hand, there is a tendency to exaggerate the malevolence of the enemy, there is a tendency to doubt the available estimates of one's own strength.

Is it likely that the ignorance and parochialism of the top elite in the Soviet Union will foster an aggressive and militant attitude by encouraging an exaggerated idea of the weakness of the rest of the world?

Comment: This appears to be a valid point, if we are to judge from most of the known examples of how ignorance and parochialism contrast with a more cosmopolitan outlook. In pre-war Japan, for instance, the leaders of the Kwantung Army were more militant and self-assured than the more widely travelled admirals of the Japanese Navy. We know that one of the most striking changes in the composition of the Soviet top leadership has been the transition from experienced cosmopolitans to the home-grown product, innocent of long association with Western Europe.

The point has added weight when we remember that intelligence agents tend to supply their principals with what they think the chief wants to hear. It is likely that Soviet agents abroad are unwilling to paint a rosy picture of the outside world for fear of being disbelieved and disciplined.

Is an exaggerated estimate of the strength of the Soviets encouraged by the comparative absence in the top leadership of men of great theoretical training and interest?

Comment: Whatever may be the sense of reality displayed by individual intellectuals, it is likely that as a group they are more critical than non-theoretical colleagues. The atmosphere of the Politburo under Lenin was intellectually vigorous and highly controversial. We know that the writers of books and articles have almost disappeared from this crucially important organ of Soviet policy.

May it not become apparent to the Soviet leaders that more freedom would strengthen rather than weaken the Soviet world?

Comment: The Soviet leaders will undoubtedly try to probe beyond the simple fact of capitalist production if it continues to outstrip Soviet output. It may become increasingly apparent to them that free labor and management is superior to the labor and managerial force of a police state. Studies of Soviet costs of supervision (including, of course, the disciplinary bureaucracy) will doubtless disclose a much higher figure than for capitalist regimes. Furthermore, it may be evident that the hyper-centralization of the Moscow regime breeds unnecessary trouble, and generates "titoism" among the many cultures inside the Soviet orbit.

Is it not likely that power changes in the Soviet world will be by evolutionary adjustment in the direction of wider sharing of power? If so, the ruling groups may undergo transformations which are not entirely visible until they occur; and the dilution of the present extreme concentration of power may reduce the conspiratorial outlook and the militancy of the regime.

Comment: This is a reasonable forecast, even though the present police state is likely to be well informed in advance of conspiracies directed against it, and to defend itself to the limit. There is evidence of the continuing strength of tendencies to "dilute" the fanaticism (the ideological purity) of the ruling group. The strength of these tendencies is reflected in the "purge cycle" of Soviet politics, which is a phenomenon also observed in other tyrannies supported by parties with large memberships. Party members try to bring relatives and friends into the Party, often with little regard to doctrinal purity; and a "purge" is a defensive gesture by the central party leaders testifying to the importance of such devolutionary factors. Territorial, ethnic, and other lines of cleavage are likely to be strengthened in this way.

Is not the long-term tendency in an industrializing society to increase the strength of pluralizing forces?

Comment: Such a society increases the role played by managers and engineers; and such social formations are more literate and alert than the peasantry. They exert unremitting individual (and to some extent, organized) pressure in order to enlarge their "privileges" (which are more important in the Soviet set-up than money income). For instance, the pressure is continually directed toward improved medical, recreational, housing, and educational facilities.

It is necessary to estimate whether these pluralizing forces set up super-centralizing tendencies as a means of defense on the part of the active members of the political elite. But we may hazard the forecast that changes in the composition of Soviet society will reflect themselves directly in the political system, with a net pluralizing effect.

11. So far as the impact of external factors is concerned, it is important to evaluate the over-all possibility of modifying Soviet intentions in a cooperative direction if it becomes apparent that the non-Soviet world is out-arming, out-developing and out-consuming the Soviet world.

As a starting point we must make some judgment of how the top members of the Soviet regime estimate their own strength.

Comment: Soviet leaders probably continue to regard themselves as backward and weak when compared with the US, and the more industrialized parts of Europe. It is probable that the adamant resistance of Soviet delegates to the inspection of arms stems from this sense of weakness. ("Will not such an inspection invite a capitalist attack in order to take advantage of the present weakness of the regime?")

The inference is that the SU is in no position to concede the inspection point, even today. Hence the diplomatic initiatives open to the Soviet government -- should they engage in a flurry of diplomatic activity -- would remain short of what is essential for disarmament. Any strong Soviet proposals at the present stage, therefore, must be advanced with the expectation that they will not be accepted, or if accepted, that they will be sabotaged at the administrative level.

This does not imply that at least some resumption of peaceful contact is out of the question. There are many assets available for bargaining purposes, particularly the threatened investments and trading relations of the old empires (especially British).

Further, we must ask whether the Soviet leadership is disposed to recognize unwelcome facts and adjust their policies to them, or whether Soviet leaders are likely to deny unwelcome developments and to engage in desperate adventurism?

As said above, Communist leaders have developed a body of maxims and precedents during their seizure and consolidation of power. These "operational rules" put an enormous amount of emphasis upon the potency of material factors in politics and society. They also permit a wide range of tactical improvisation whenever even their own policies appear to be endangering their power position. Absence of sentimentality is one of the main features of the "operational code" of the Politburo. (The reference is to the analysis by Leites.) The "code" includes the idea that the most disagreeable contingencies should be frankly faced, and dealt with by tactics of retreat if necessary.

Soviet leaders are disciplined to think in terms of material production, and may be expected to give close attention to such trends. Should the US forge ahead as rapidly as indicated above, it is safe to forecast that the political consequences will be discounted well in advance. If the Soviet leaders act rationally within their own doctrine, they will recognize that in isolation they are heading toward relatively greater weakness. Tactically, it will be incumbent upon them to emerge from isolation and to seek to develop a more favorable balance of power within the framework of limited UN cooperation. Otherwise, they face the likelihood of being confronted at

some future date with an ultimatum to disarm and open up to inspection. And this would represent a drastic loss of power, which they may be able to avoid.

It is not necessary to predict the doctrinal justification of such a Soviet line. As indicated above, there is ample support for the theory of peaceful co-existence.

(We may also recall that in the past the spokesmen on behalf of militant ideologies have sometimes succeeded, when halted by outside forces, in transforming themselves into less sectarian leaders.)

CLOSING COMMENT

12. Obviously the foregoing points do not exhaust the contingencies to be taken into account in a thorough investigation of the nature and magnitude of the threat to our national security. Having outlined two sets of contingencies, A and B, it may be worth reiterating that the problem of policy is to engage in a continuing exercise of judgment in which all contingencies are integrated with one another in the light of policy objectives and of available knowledge of how significant conditioning factors have operated in the past. Clearly, the act of assessing the "realism" of the postulates set up in any theoretical model calls for evaluation in the light of the entire context.

The task of estimating the threat is more than an exercise in forecasting. The process is likely to stimulate creative ideas about the paths open to policy; and these alternatives may gain enough support to affect the future in ways compatible with fundamental goals.

(As a slight indication of these possibilities: If the foregoing interpretation of the factors that may influence Soviet policy is sound, part of our opportunity is to facilitate the process. We have suggested why the Soviet leaders, if they come to believe that the non-Soviet world is outdoing them, will be amenable to the relaxation of the "cold war". It may be that timely proposals will expedite this result. For example, it may sooner or later be feasible to suggest that the "citadel principle" be applied to the problem of reducing armament. By this term is meant that certain areas of a power are reserved from inspection by the UN. At the same time, all the rest of the territory is thrown open to such inspection. The "citadel principle" is no final solution, since the "reserved" area is a continuing source of anxiety abroad. But the opening up of any territory would constitute an important step toward creating a yet more favorable atmosphere for completing the process of crisis reduction, and building a more secure world community.)

Returning, finally, to the general questions concerning Soviet intentions and capabilities (Section #4 above), we note once more the significance of our own policies in affecting the outcome. (Section #4, see D.2.a. above) In part, our estimate of the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat depends upon the estimate that we make of the impact of U. S. policies upon the Soviet world (directly and indirectly through other countries). The Soviet leadership appraises the impact upon Soviet strength of our domestic as well as foreign policies, and of our activity in all spheres of policy (diplomatic, economic, military, psychological).

A further word may be said about the four-fold division of policy which has again been referred to above. It is used mainly because it has received a degree of acceptance, even though terminology varies, and definitions are not always clear. (I prefer to operate with a system of analysis in which policies are classified according to eight categories of "values" so defined that any set of policy making and executing activities, actual or potential, can be described and compared according to the principle of maximization. But the present brief memorandum would be overloaded with "definitions without exemplification" if this system were introduced.)

As a check list of national policy, therefore, we adhere to the four-fold division previously mentioned. Each division can be analyzed according to objectives, distinctive means, and allied means:

Diplomatic policy aims at agreements among leaders; the distinctive means is negotiation; allied means are economic, military, and psychological.

Economic policy aims at affecting production and consumption; the distinctive means are resources; allied means are diplomatic, military and psychological.

Military policy aims at effects upon intentions and capabilities involving force; the distinctive means are the armed forces and the specialized instruments of coercion; allied means are diplomatic, economic and psychological.

Psychological policy aims at influencing the attitudes of large groups; the distinctive instruments are the media of communication; allied means are diplomatic, economic and military.

In the decision making process adjustments are made among long, middle and short range objectives within each sphere, and among the spheres. To some extent these adjustments occur on the basis of expectations concerning the nature and magnitude of actual and potential threats. The making of such estimates is part of the continuing exercise of judgment in the formulation and execution of national policy.

In a free society official perspectives need to be subject to active, well-intentioned and informed review by private citizens. Some sort of continuing review — well-intentioned or not — is unavoidable in any case. The task at hand is to consider the potentialities for the making of an unofficial review that is unquestionably well-intentioned, and is as well-informed as possible under the circumstances.